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INTRODUCTION 
There is no sense in declaring that an action is outside someone’s 
scope of power after the action has already occurred. In much the same 
way, it does not matter whether someone may chop down a tree after the 
tree is down. Yet, the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the quo 
warranto writ in League of Women Voters of Florida v. Scott1 allows the 
figurative tree to be cut down and then later declares it should have been 
protected.  
At the December 2016 press conference announcing then-Fifth 
District Court of Appeal Chief Judge C. Alan Lawson as his first pick for 
the Florida Supreme Court, Florida Governor Rick Scott told reporters, 
“I’ll appoint three more justices the morning I finish my term.”2 To the 
uninitiated, this statement may seem innocuous, but it alluded to a 
potential constitutional clash decades in the making.  
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. 2019, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. 2016, University of South 
Florida. This Comment is dedicated to my best friend, Kristen Woodruff. I would like to thank 
Dean Jon L. Mills for the inspiration for this Comment. I would also like to thank my parents—
Sheila and Wesley Wilcox—for their unending support in all areas of my life. Finally, I would 
like to express my admiration and appreciation for all my friends on the Florida Law Review, our 
staff editor Lisa Caldwell, and our faculty advisor Mark Fenster. If this Comment is good, know 
it is because I stand on the shoulders of giants. 
 1. 232 So. 3d 264 (Fla. 2017). 
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Unlike the federal system, justices on Florida’s highest court are 
selected by an appointment process—a version of the Missouri Plan3—
involving only a Judicial Nominating Commission (JNC) and the 
governor.4 When a vacancy opens on the Florida Supreme Court, the 
Florida constitution tasks a JNC with nominating between three and six 
nominees for the open seat.5 The governor selects the new justice from 
this list of nominees.6 The new justice then takes her seat on the bench, 
with no involvement by the legislative branch.7 
Also, unlike the federal judiciary, Florida imposes the limitation of 
mandatory retirement upon its members of the state’s highest court.8 At 
the time the Florida Supreme Court rendered its decision in League of 
Women Voters, the mandatory retirement age for a justice in Florida was 
seventy.9 On the justice’s seventieth birthday, the justice must retire or, 
if the justice’s birthday falls in the second half of her term,10 the justice 
may serve the remainder of her six-year term.11 At the conclusion of the 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See Sandra Day O’Connor, The Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan, 74 
MO. L. REV. 479, 485–86 (2009). 
 4. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11(a).  
 5. See id. (“Whenever a vacancy occurs in a judicial office . . . the governor shall fill the 
vacancy by appointing . . . one of not fewer than three persons nor more than six persons 
nominated by the appropriate judicial nominating commission.”). A Judicial Nominating 
Commission consists of: (1) five members—who reside in the territorial jurisdiction of the 
affected court, with two who are actively practicing members of The Florida Bar—selected by the 
governor and (2) four members—who are actively practicing members of The Florida Bar and 
reside in the territorial jurisdiction of the affected court—selected by the governor from nominees 
submitted by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar. FLA. STAT. § 43.291(1) (2018). 
 6. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11(a).  
 7. Id. 
 8. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 8 (2016). 
 9. Id. During the 2018 election, Florida voters approved Amendment Six, which—in 
addition to two other entirely unrelated constitutional changes—changed the mandatory 
retirement age to seventy-five. See, e.g., Florida Amendment 6, Marsy’s Law Crime Victim Rights, 




 10. In 1976, Florida moved to merit-retention elections for justices on the state supreme 
court. See generally Scott G. Hawkins, Perspective on Judicial Merit Retention in Florida, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 1421, 1422–25 (2012) (providing a short history and explanation of merit retention 
in Florida). Justices serve terms of six years. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a). In every sixth year of 
service on the state high court, a justice faces merit retention. Id. If the justice is not retained—
meaning that less than 50% of voters voted to retain the justice—then the governor selects a new 
justice in the same way that he would have if the justice was forced to retire due to age. Id. 
 11. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 8 (2016). In addition to raising the mandatory retirement age, 
Amendment Six removed this language. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 8 (2019). 
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retiring justice’s term, the governor in office at the time of the vacancy 
must appoint a successor justice.12 
An unintended consequence of this selection and retirement scheme 
is that, in some instances, the term of a governor leaving office and the 
term of a justice being forced to retire would occur at the same time.13 In 
Florida, the governor’s term runs for four years—from the first Tuesday 
after the first Monday in the year following his election to the first 
Monday of the year following the election of a new governor.14 So, at the 
stroke of midnight on that Tuesday, the outgoing governor’s term ends 
and the new governor’s term begins.15 Similarly, an outgoing justice’s 
term ends at midnight on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of the 
year after the sixth year of the justice’s final term.16 Simply put, at the 
stroke of midnight, the outgoing governor’s term ends, the incoming 
governor’s term begins, and the term-limited justice’s term ends. This 
raises the question: Could the outgoing governor select a justice to 
replace an outgoing justice when his term ends at the same time as the 
outgoing justice’s term?  
Governor Scott’s statement to the press regarding his intention to 
“appoint three more justices the morning [he] finish[ed his] term” 
reflected his view that he did have the power to appoint justices to replace 
those whose terms ended at the same time as his—midnight on January 
8, 2019.17 Accordingly, in June 2017, the League of Women Voters (the 
“League”) brought suit to challenge the Governor’s view on his power to 
appoint replacements for the three outgoing justices—Justices Barbara 
Pariente, Fred Lewis, and Peggy Quince.18 The League argued that, “[a]s 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. § 11(a). 
 13. Following Amendment Six’s passage in 2018, this would only happen if a justice was 
not retained in her merit-retention election. See supra text accompanying notes 98–109. 
 14. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a). 
 15. Governor Scott argued that a new governor’s term would not begin until he took the 
oath of office—at a ceremony in the morning of the first day of his term. Governor’s Response in 
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto at 21, League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Scott, 
232 So. 3d 264 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC17-1122). However—as Justice Quince noted—all governors 
in the twenty-first century have taken the oath before their term actually began, ensuring that they 
assumed the office of governor at exactly midnight on the first day of their term. League of Women 
Voters, 232 So. 3d at 267–68 (Quince, J., concurring). 
 16. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11(a). 
 17. 12/16/16 Press Conference on Florida Supreme Court Appointment, supra note 2. 
Governor Scott’s term ended at midnight on January 8, 2019, as he was ineligible to run for a 
third term as governor. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(b). 
 18. Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto at 3, League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d 264 (No. 
SC17-1122). This question was of great importance in the lead-up to the 2018 gubernatorial 
election, as the three justices being forced to retire were the only three remaining justices 
appointed by a Democratic governor—the remainder being Republican appointees. See Former 
Justices, FLA. SUP. CT., https://www.floridasupremecourt.org/Justices/Former-Justices 
3
Wilcox: Allowing the Tree to be Cut Down: Quo Warranto Writs in Florida
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1544 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
a matter of constitutional law, [the three outgoing justices’] judicial terms 
do not expire to create vacancies until Governor Scott’s successor will 
have taken office.”19 To resolve these long-standing conflicting views20 
on gubernatorial power, the League sought “a writ of quo warranto to 
prevent Governor Scott from appointing the successor to any 
justice . . . whose final term expires [o]n January [8,] 2019.”21 
I.  QUO WARRANTO WRITS 
A quo warranto writ is an extraordinary writ used to challenge a 
defendant’s ability to exercise a power or right derived from the state.22 
“‘[Q]uo warranto’ means ‘by what authority’” and serves as a way to 
challenge a state actor’s usurpation or misuse of a certain power.23 The 
Florida constitution explicitly places the power to issue quo warranto 
writs to “state officers and state agencies” with the state supreme court.24 
This power, however, is discretionary.25 Accordingly, quo warranto writs 
provide an effective recourse to block state actions that are overbroad but 
have yet to cause any quantifiable harm. 
                                                                                                                 
[https://perma.cc/H5RP-GNR3]. In the end, Ron DeSantis, a Republican, defeated Andrew 
Gillum, a Democrat, to succeed Governor Scott. Jessica Taylor, Democrat Andrew Gillum 
Concedes Florida Governor’s Race to Ron DeSantis, NPR (Nov. 17, 2018, 5:39 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/11/17/668321180/andrew-gillum-concedes-floridas-governor-s-race-
to-ron-desantis [https://perma.cc/AA6K-4CXH]. However, the margin between the candidates 
was less than half of a percentage point—the tightest in state history. Id. Since the chance for a 
Democrat to be elected governor and, in turn, appoint three new justices to maintain the 
ideological makeup of the court was seen as good, ensuring that the newly elected governor—and 
not Governor Scott—was able to make the appointments was a high priority for state Democrats. 
See Mary Ellen Klas, Who Gets to Appoint 3 New Florida Justices, Rick Scott or the Next 
Governor?, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/Who-
gets-to-appoint-3-new-Florida-justices-Rick-Scott-or-the-next-governor-_162229946 [perma.cc/ 
8X3N-FQ7S].  
 19. Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 18, at 2.  
 20. In 1998, Governor Lawton Chiles—a Democrat whose term was ending—faced a 
similar dilemma. Linda Kleindienst, Bush, Chiles Agree to Put Black Woman on Supreme Court, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 9, 1998), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1998-12-09/news/981 
2090161_1_quince-lawton-chiles-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/5X3N-YAZ9]. Justice Ben 
Overton’s term was set to expire on the night of Governor Chiles’s last day in office. Id. To avoid 
a constitutional clash, Governor Chiles reached an agreement with his successor, Governor-elect 
Jeb Bush—a Republican—to jointly appoint Justice Peggy Quince. Id. A similar situation 
occurred when Governor Chiles took office. James C. Clark, Past Inaugurals Have Been Time for 
Dirty Deals, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 6, 1991), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1991-01-
06/news/9101040758_1_florida-governors-oath-bob-martinez [https://perma.cc/4BMA-PKJ9]. 
 21. Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 18, at 3.  
 22. Ex parte Smith, 118 So. 306, 307 (Fla. 1928). 
 23. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 607 (Fla. 2008). 
 24. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8). 
 25. See id. (noting that the Court “[m]ay issue writs of quo warranto” (emphasis added)). 
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The origin of the quo warranto writ—a common law writ of inquiry—
is relatively obscured by its age.26 However, eighteenth-century legal 
scholar William Blackstone, in his influential treatise Commentaries on 
the Law of England, described the writ as a “writ of right for the king, 
against [someone] who . . . usurps any office, franchise or liberty” of the 
Crown.27 Over time, however, the writ has turned into a remedy designed 
to oust the usurper of a power from the state and to punish him with a 
criminal fine.28  
As with many old English legal concepts, the quo warranto writ was 
made part of the law of several states when the United States came into 
existence.29 In 1894, the Florida Supreme Court observed that “for some 
time before the revolution the writ was regarded in England, though 
criminal in form, as a civil proceeding to test the right of a party to 
exercise a franchise, and of ousting a wrongful possessor.”30 Since then, 
the writ of quo warranto in Florida has served as the legal remedy 
available to constrain a state official or agency acting outside of 
constitutional bounds.31  
Generally, absent an alternate statutory framework, the writ is the only 
remedy for a usurpation of state power.32 Likewise, if there is another 
sufficient remedy, the writ is not available.33 In this regard, the writ often 
serves as the sole method for testing the political power of a state official. 
It is a powerful—and effective—way for citizens to constrain the state 
government to the limits of power established by the state constitution.34 
II.  LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS AND THE QUO WARRANTO WRIT 
Under article V, § 3(b)(8) of the Florida constitution, the Florida 
Supreme Court has discretionary original jurisdiction over quo warranto 
                                                                                                                 
 26. For a more extensive history of the quo warranto writ in Florida, see generally Richard 
W. Ervin & Roy T. Rhodes, Quo Warranto in Florida, 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 559 (1951). 
 27. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *263. 
 28. Buckman v. State ex rel. Spencer, 15 So. 697, 699 (Fla. 1894). 
 29. See Territory v. Lockwood, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 236, 238–39 (1866). 
 30. Buckman, 15 So. at 699. 
 31. Winter v. Mack, 194 So. 225, 228 (Fla. 1940) (“Quo warranto is the proper remedy to 
test the right of a person to hold an office or franchise or exercise some right of privilege, the 
peculiar powers of which are derived from the State.”). 
 32. Swoope v. City of New Smyrna, 125 So. 371, 372 (Fla. 1929).  
 33. Id. 
 34. In Florida—as in all states—the constitution serves as a limiting document, placing 
boundaries around near unlimited power vested in the state government and reserving power to 
the people of the state. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All political power is inherent in the people. 
The enunciation herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained 
by the people.”); see also infra note 107 (citing similar constitutional provisions in other states). 
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writs.35 The court accepted jurisdiction over the League’s challenge to 
the Governor and heard arguments in November 2017—almost a year 
after the Governor’s initial comment and a year before the election for 
the next governor.36 In a per curiam decision, the court found that it did 
not have jurisdiction to issue a quo warranto writ related to Governor 
Scott’s intention to appoint replacements for the three retiring justices 
because the Governor had not yet exercised a power beyond his 
authority.37 
The League’s challenge to Governor Scott’s assertion that he could 
appoint the replacements for Justices Pariente, Lewis, and Quince 
centered around two issues: Could the Governor appoint the replacements 
and could the court issue a writ of quo warranto to answer the first 
question?38 
With regard to the first question, there was general consensus that 
Governor Scott did not have the power to appoint the replacement 
justices.39 While the per curiam majority opinion does not hint at this, 
Justice Quince’s concurrence points out that, under any reasonable 
reading of the Florida constitution, Governor Scott would be unable to 
appoint replacements for justices whose terms ended concurrently with 
his.40 And, as evidenced by the eventual issuance of the quo warranto 
writ, Justice Quince’s view was correct.41 
However, the more significant issue of the challenge was the 
appropriateness of a quo warranto writ before Governor Scott actually 
appointed replacement justices. The Governor argued that, irrespective of 
the determination regarding his ability to make the appointments, the 
League could not raise a quo warranto challenge for a power that he had 
not yet exercised.42 Further, the Governor argued that until he actually 
appointed the replacement justices, the League could not seek a quo 
warranto writ to challenge his power to appoint the replacement 
justices.43 
                                                                                                                 
 35. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8). 
 36. League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Scott, 232 So. 3d 264, 264 (Fla. 2017). 
 37. Id. at 264, 266. 
 38. Id. at 264–65. 
 39. Even counsel for the Governor seemed to agree. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d 264 (No. SC17-1122), https://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/ 
transcript/pdfs/17-1122.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6Y2-YF3A]. 
 40. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 267–68 (Quince, J., concurring). 
 41. See Order Granting Writ of Quo Warranto, League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Scott, 
257 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 2018) (No. SC18-1573). 
 42. Governor’s Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 
15, at 9–11.  
 43. Id. 
6
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The per curiam majority opinion rested its decision solely on this 
portion of the argument.44 The majority opinion avoided any ruling on 
the substantive grounds for the quo warranto writ and instead focused on 
its timeliness.45 The court reasoned that both the purpose of quo warranto 
writs and their historical usage showed that this remedy was unavailable 
to the League at that time.46 
In its analysis, the majority first turned to the purpose of quo warranto 
writs, as established in Swoope v. City of New Smyrna.47 In Swoope, 
decided in 1929, the court noted that a challenge to an individual’s 
exercise of authority “appropriately fall[s] within the jurisdiction of the 
common law courts by proceedings in quo warranto.”48 Further, it stated 
that quo warranto is available the moment that a power is usurped.49 As 
established by this precedent, the purpose of quo warranto writs is to 
determine whether a state actor has “improperly exercised a right or 
power from the State.”50 So, in the view of the majority, to grant or deny 
a quo warranto writ for a “threatened exercise of power”—what Governor 
Scott’s pronouncement of his intention to appoint new justices was—
would be “an impermissible advisory opinion based upon hypothetical 
facts.”51  
Subsequently, the majority noted that Florida courts have typically 
constrained the use of the writ to actions by officials that have already 
taken place. The majority cited three cases where the state actor had 
already acted and the court then held that a quo warranto writ was the 
“appropriate vehicle” to challenge the completed action.52 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                 
 44. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 266 (“Until some action is taken by the 
Governor, the matter the League seeks to have resolved is not ripe, and this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to determine whether quo warranto relief is warranted.”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 265. 
 47. 125 So. 371 (Fla. 1929). 
 48. Id. at 372. 
 49. Id. 
 50. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 265. 
 51. Id. Under the Florida constitution, the governor—though only for questions “affecting 
the governor’s executive powers and duties”—may ask for and receive advisory opinions from 
the Florida Supreme Court. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c).  
 52. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 265–66 (first citing Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 
702, 705 (Fla. 2011) (reviewing the Governor’s authority to issue an executive order suspending 
the rulemaking procedures of state agencies—after the order was issued); then citing State ex rel. 
Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1998), abrogated in part by Darling v. State, 45 
So. 3d 444 (Fla. 2010) (reviewing the authority of the Office of the Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel for the Northern and Southern Regions to represent death row inmates—after the Office 
began filling suits on the inmates’ behalf); and then citing Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 756–
57 (Fla. 2017) (reviewing the Governor’s authority to issue executive orders reassigning the 
prosecution of certain cases from one state attorney to another—after the orders were issued)). 
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the majority concluded that the use of a “[writ of] quo warranto to review 
an action which is merely contemplated but not consummated . . . would 
require this Court to depart from the historical application of the writ.”53 
Additionally, addressing a point by the League, the majority 
dismissed the argument that the court’s previous decision in Florida 
House of Representatives v. Crist54 suggested that quo warranto writs 
could be used to prohibit future conduct.55 Rather, the court in Crist said 
that, while “[t]he Governor contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction 
because the House does not seek . . . to enjoin the future exercise of his 
authority[,] . . . these are not the only grounds for issuing such a writ.”56 
This language suggests that “enjoin[ing] the future exercise 
of . . . authority” is one—though not the only—ground to issue a quo 
warranto writ.57 The League of Women Voters majority summarily 
rejected this reading of Crist but never addressed alternative 
interpretations.58 
In the end, the majority opinion—while rejecting the League’s 
challenge at that time—left the door open for a quo warranto writ before 
the Governor actually made appointments to the court.59 So, when the 
Governor finally made a concrete action toward appointing the 
replacement justices—directing the Florida Supreme Court JNC to begin 
soliciting applications for the positions—the League again filed for a quo 
warranto writ.60 Yet, in an unsigned order, the court this time issued the 
writ of quo warranto against the Governor, declaring in no uncertain 
terms that “[t]he governor who is elected in the November 2018 general 
election has the sole authority to fill the vacancies . . . .”61  
However, was the court’s decision to wait for the Governor to 
affirmatively act the proper interpretation of the use of the writ? Justice 
Lewis’s dissent in League of Women Voters argued it was not.62 
  
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 266. 
 54. 999 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2008). 
 55. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 265 n.1. 
 56. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 607. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 265 n.1. 
 59. Id. at 266 (“Until some action is taken by the Governor, the matter the League seeks to 
have resolved is not ripe, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether quo warranto 
relief is warranted.”). 
 60. Emergency Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto at 10–11, League of Women Voters of 
Fla. v. Scott, 257 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 2018) (No. SC18-1573). 
 61. Order Granting Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 41. 
 62. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 268 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
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III.  JUSTICE LEWIS’S VIEW ON QUO WARRANTO WRITS 
Justice Lewis’s dissent provides an alternative view on the use of the 
quo warranto writ to prevent imminent usurpation of power. Justice 
Lewis argued that the court should have granted the quo warranto writ in 
this instance because Governor Scott’s intention to appoint the 
replacement justices—despite having taken no actions—was “concrete 
and unequivocal” enough to not be an advisory opinion.63 Justice Lewis’s 
argument discussed the history of quo warranto writs in the state, the 
purpose of quo warranto writs, the use of quo warranto writs in similar 
situations but in different states, and the practical considerations behind 
the use of this extraordinary writ.64  
First, Justice Lewis looked to Florida precedent, including a recent 
case that also involved an attempted judicial appointment by Governor 
Scott. In Lerman v. Scott,65 decided in 2016, Governor Scott’s ability to 
fill a vacancy for a county court judge, created by Florida’s Resign to Run 
statute,66 was challenged with a petition for a writ of quo warranto by 
Gregg Lerman, a candidate in the election to replace the retiring judge.67 
Governor Scott had announced his intention to appoint a successor to the 
outgoing judge, yet under Florida Statutes section 99.012, the resignation 
of a judge creates a vacancy that should be filled by an election, 
preventing the governor from appointing a replacement.68 The Florida 
Supreme Court found that section 99.012 restricted a governor’s 
appointment powers and, accordingly, granted the writ of quo warranto—
finding that the appointment was outside the bounds of the Governor’s 
powers.69 Justice Lewis pointed out that this recent opinion shows the 
faulty logic of the majority in requiring the appointment to be 
“consummated” before quo warranto is appropriate.70  
Further, Justice Lewis pointed to a myriad of cases that clearly state 
that quo warranto writs are “appropriate in cases of threatened or 
attempted action by a state official.”71 In each of these cases, the Florida 
Supreme Court explicitly used the words “threatened” or “attempted” 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 269. 
 64. See id. at 268 (explaining Justice Lewis’s take on quo warranto writs in the state as a 
whole). 
 65. No. SC16-783, 2016 WL 3127708 (Fla. June 3, 2016). 
 66. FLA. STAT. § 99.012 (2018). 
 67. Lerman, 2016 WL 3127708, at *1. 
 68. FLA. STAT. § 99.012(3)(f)(1) (“[T]he resignation creates a vacancy in office to be filled 
by election.”). 
 69. Lerman, 2016 WL 3127708, at *1. 
 70. League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Scott, 232 So. 3d 264, 269 (Fla. 2017) (Lewis, J., 
dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 269–70. 
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action.72 Moreover, the court has never limited the writ to acts that have 
already occurred or to acts that are ongoing.73 
Second, Justice Lewis pointed to the very purpose of quo warranto 
writs as evidence that the majority’s interpretation was illogically 
limited.74 It is a generally recognized principle—both in Florida law75 and 
in the old English common law origins of the writ76—that the quo 
warranto writ is “available to prevent significant impacts on the operation 
of government.”77 If the writ is only available after “illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct which produces disarray” occurs, Justice Lewis 
argued, then the writ can no longer prevent significant impacts—it would 
allow only for post hoc cleanup of those impacts.78 
Justice Lewis also examined how other states interpret the quo 
warranto writ. In 2017, Vermont faced a situation similar to the one in 
Florida.79 The outgoing governor, Governor Peter Shumlin, announced 
his intention to appoint the replacement for Justice John Dooley—who 
was in his last term.80 Yet, Justice Dooley’s term would not expire until 
April—months after Governor Shumlin had left office.81 After Governor 
Shumlin announced his intention to appoint a successor, Vermont House 
of Representatives Minority Leader Don Turner filed a petition for a writ 
                                                                                                                 
 72. State ex rel. Bruce v. Kiesling, 632 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 1994) (“[W]e note that the 
common law remedy of quo warranto is employed . . . to challenge a public officer’s attempt to 
exercise some right or privilege derived from the State.” (emphasis added)); State ex rel. Ervin v. 
Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 139 So.2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1962) (“It is a proper function of the 
Attorney General, in the interest of the public, to test the exercise, or threatened exercise, of 
power . . . through the process of a quo warranto proceeding.” (emphasis added)); Adm’r, Retreat 
Hosp. v. Johnson, 660 So. 2d 333, 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he remedy of quo 
warranto . . . is designed to challenge a public officer’s attempt to exercise some right or privilege 
derived from the state . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 73. See Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 607 (Fla. 2008) (dismissing 
Governor Charlie Crist’s argument that, since he had already completed the disputed action, a quo 
warranto writ would not be available); State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So. 2d 404, 406 
(Fla. 1998) (using quo warranto to determine the ability of the Office of Capital Collateral 
Regional Counsel for Southern and Northern Regions to represent death row inmates in civil 
rights lawsuits after the representation had concluded and the cases had been dismissed), 
abrogated in part by Darling v. State, 45 So. 3d 444 (Fla. 2010). 
 74. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 271 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
 75. Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 708 (Fla. 2011). 
 76. See JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES § 591 (Chicago, 
2d ed., Callaghan & Co. 1884). 
 77. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 268 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Turner v. Shumlin, 163 A.3d 1173, 1175–76 (Vt. 2017). 
 80. Id. at 1176. 
 81. Id. 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 6 [], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss6/6
2019] ALLOWING THE TREE TO BE CUT DOWN 1551 
 
of quo warranto to declare appointment outside of the Governor’s 
power.82 
Governor Shumlin—like Governor Scott—argued that his action 
could only be challenged by quo warranto after he made the 
appointment.83 In the end, however, the Vermont Supreme Court granted 
the writ and extoled the value of ensuring the “integrity of our governing 
institutions and the people’s confidence in them.”84 Justice Lewis argued 
that, by ignoring this interpretation of the quo warranto writ, the majority 
adopted a wrongheaded approach to this old English extraordinary writ 
and failed to maintain the “integrity of our governing institutions.”85 
Finally, Justice Lewis presented the majority’s limits to the quo 
warranto writ as impractical.86 Oftentimes the government—and the 
fallible humans who compose it—will stretch the bounds of its power, 
hoping to expand beyond its limits before it can be preemptively 
stopped.87 This is particularly damaging if the action is long-lasting or 
permanent—as was Governor Scott’s direction to the JNC to begin 
interviewing candidates for the new justices and to prepare short lists.88 
The majority, by limiting the use of quo warranto in this situation, allows 
harmful and illegal conduct to occur without practical remedies.89 
“Magnificent trees cut, pristine waters fouled, and unthinkable harm 
inflicted upon our citizens, which may not be prevented when the actor 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1177. 
 84. Id. at 1188. 
 85. League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Scott, 232 So. 3d 264, 268–69 (Fla. 2017) (Lewis, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Turner, 163 A.3d at 1188). Ironically, just like in Florida, the court 
allowed the then-composed Judicial Nominating Board—with members chosen by Governor 
Shumlin—to begin interviewing candidates and to select the short list for Governor Shumlin’s 
successor to choose from. See Peter Hirschfeld, Vermont Supreme Court Rules Shumlin Can’t 
Appoint Justice’s Replacement, VPR (Jan. 4, 2017), http://digital.vpr.net/post/vermont-supreme-
court-rules-shumlin-cant-appoint-justices-replacement#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/6GF7-YUZ2].  
 86. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 270 (Lewis, J., dissenting).   
 87. See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF 
NEW YORK (1974) (explaining how Robert Moses, the New York City chief city planner and 
“master builder,” planned construction projects). Despite dubious, at best, claims to and ongoing 
litigation over a piece of land, Mr. Moses began building a city park on the piece of land. Id. at 
216–17. By the time appellate proceedings over the ownership of the land began, Mr. Moses had 
completed the park and it received hundreds of thousands of patrons. Id. Mr. Moses stepped over 
the limits of his power, but what was a court to do—Destroy the park and waste hundreds of 
thousands of taxpayer dollars? Id. 
 88. Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 946 (Fla. 2009) (“We conclude that the Governor is bound 
by the Florida Constitution to appoint a nominee from the JNC’s certified list, within sixty days 
of that certification. [W]e hold that . . . the Governor lacks authority under the constitution to seek 
a new list of nominees from the JNC and has a mandatory duty to fill the vacancy . . . with an 
appointment from the [original] list . . . .”).  
 89. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 269 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
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plans and even announces his intentions.”90 In his dissent, Justice Lewis 
argued that limiting this extraordinary writ in this way damages the 
constitutional order of the state.91  
And, in the end, even if the majority opinion is correct that Florida has 
a more limited approach to quo warranto writs, Justice Lewis argued that 
this approach should be abandoned.92 Justice Lewis noted that the 
majority’s reluctance to look to a full picture of the writ’s historical use 
overlooked precedent that gives the court significant leeway to use the 
writ.93 Justice Lewis cited State ex rel. Watkins v. Fernandez,94 which 
discussed how the court has, when necessary, allowed the writ to expand 
to circumstances beyond those originally intended.95 In short, the law 
should be allowed to evolve with the varying needs of society.96 
Quo warranto writs are remedial and extraordinary writs.97 By 
limiting the writ to actions that have occurred or are ongoing, the majority 
fails to allow the writ to fulfill its function—to prevent usurpation of 
power and to allow the people to constrain the government to its 
constitutional limits in the absence of other remedies.98 Justice Lewis 
argued that the purpose of the writ of quo warranto alone should allow 
the court to grant the writ to prevent Governor Scott from overstepping 
his constitutional authority.99 
CONCLUSION 
Quo warranto writs provide the people of the state of Florida with a 
tool to challenge the usurpation of power by state actors. As Justices 
Pariente, Quince, and Lewis; counsel for the Governor; and an eventual 
majority of the court all agreed, the Governor would have usurped power 
by appointing replacement justices for the three justices who were 
constitutionally required to retire concurrently with the expiration of 
Governor Scott’s term in office. The only thing that remained contested 
was when the Supreme Court of Florida has the power to prevent this 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 271. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 143 So. 638 (1932). 
 95. Id. at 641 (“In a changing world marked by the ebb and flow of social and economic 
shifts, new conditions constantly arise which make it necessary, that no right be without a remedy, 
to extend the old and tried remedies. It is the function of courts to do this. It may be done by 
working old fields, but, when it becomes necessary, they should not hesitate to ‘break new ground’ 
to do so.”). 
 96. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 271 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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usurpation. The Governor argued that it would only be appropriate to 
challenge the usurpation after the Governor had appointed the three new 
justices to the Florida Supreme Court—leaving the court to determine its 
own membership and setting off a constitutional crisis.100 Justices Quince 
and Pariente—and an eventual majority of the court—thought that it 
would be appropriate only when the Governor actually began the process 
of nominating the replacement justices, though at some point before the 
appointment of the justices.101 Yet, these limits to the use of the quo 
warranto writ make it insufficient to prevent usurpation.  
The consequences of this case highlight the insufficiency of the 
majority’s view, which prevents the court from fashioning a remedy to 
stop irreversible action before it occurs. Following the court’s eventual 
issuance of the writ, most media outlets portrayed the decision as a defeat 
for Governor Scott.102 Yet, a more nuanced view of the decision shows 
that the Governor had already essentially exercised a power that the court 
said he did not possess.  
The Governor had already impaneled the JNC at the time of the writ 
and this JNC selected the list of nominees that the newly elected governor 
chose justices from.103 And, despite the Florida Bar selecting the 
Commissioners as an independent check on the governor’s power, 
modern governors have essentially picked these Commission 
members.104 In short, a JNC composed entirely of Governor Scott 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Governor’s Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 
15, at 9–11. 
 101. League of Women Voters, 232 So. 3d at 267 (Quince, J., concurring). 
 102. See, e.g., Lorelei Laird, Florida Supreme Court Rules That Current Governor Can’t 
Replace 3 Retiring Justices, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 16, 2018, 1:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/florida_supreme_court_rules_next_governor_should_pick_three_new_justices 
[https://perma.cc/8BQ9-V767]; Mark J. Stern, The Florida Supreme Court Just Stopped Rick 
Scott From Packing It After His Term Ends, SLATE (Oct. 15, 2018, 5:28 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/florida-supreme-court-rick-scott.html 
[https://perma.cc/C35T-CBJ9]. 
 103. Emergency Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 60, at 10–11. 
 104. While the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar selects nominees for the four 
members of the Commission, the governor ultimately nominates them to the Commission. FLA. 
STAT. § 43.291(1)(a) (2018). In turn, the governor may reject the nominees. Id. Governor Scott 
has used this discretion to ensure that the JNC was entirely composed of members of his 
choosing—as have all governors in the twenty-first century. Diana L. Martin & Donna M. Krusbe, 
An Overview of the Selection of Florida’s Judiciary, 16 J. FLA. B. APP. PRAC. SEC., June 1, 2009, 
at 24. Some have argued that this has effectively neutralized the principles of nonpartisanship 
behind the judicial nominating scheme implemented in 1972 by Governor Reubin Askew. See, 
e.g., The Politicization of Florida’s Courts is a Crisis, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Nov. 30, 2018, 6:00 
PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/editorials/fl-op-edit-florida-supreme-court-201811 
30-story.html [https://perma.cc/P5KL-U2K2] (“Under Republican governors since 2001, and 
particularly under Scott, many of Florida’s 26 judicial nominating commissions have come to 
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appointees created the list of people from which Governor DeSantis was 
required to pick new justices.105 Allowing this exercise of power by the 
outgoing Governor Scott stands in contrast to the Florida constitution’s 
organization of power.106 State constitutions stand as limiting documents, 
limiting the already substantial power of a state government.107 To allow 
a state actor to create a fait accompli situation, using powers clearly 
beyond the scope of the actor’s office, is antithetical to the system of 
power established by the Florida constitution. 
And, while Governor Scott was succeeded by a member of his own 
party, unlike in previous gubernatorial transitions, Governor Scott did not 
seek compromises with his successor.108 In appointing controversial 
picks for agencies and new appellate judges in the final days of his term, 
Governor Scott showed that he likely intended to keep to his word to 
replace the three outgoing justices with justices of his own selection—no 
matter his successor’s party affiliation.109 Governor Scott, despite being 
constitutionally precluded from selecting three new justices, exercised 
                                                                                                                 
resemble Republican patronage committees. In other words, to be considered, you have to be a 
Republican.”). 
 105. See Carolina Bolado, 11 Names Sent to Fla. Gov.-Elect for 3 High Court Seats, LAW360 
(Nov. 27, 2018, 9:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1105437/11-names-sent-to-fla-gov-
elect-for-3-high-court-seats [https://perma.cc/Z36D-RGHL]. 
 106. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All political power is inherent in the people. The 
enunciation herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the 
people.”). 
 107. The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. State governments are free to 
grant freedoms, rights, and privileges above the floor of the federal Constitution and each serve 
as laboratories for innovation in this regard. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and 
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). The state constitution also 
serves as the limit on the scope of state governmental power, ensuring that the people retain the 
remaining power. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All political power is inherent in the people. 
The enunciation herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained 
by the people.”); HAW. CONST. art. 1 § 1 (“All political power of this State is inherent in the people 
and the responsibility for the exercise thereof rests with the people.”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“All 
political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, 
and instituted for their benefit.”); WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All power is inherent in the people, 
and all free governments are founded on their authority. . . .”). 
 108. See Marc Caputo & Matt Dixon, Rick Scott Blindsides DeSantis on His Way Out, 
POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/10/rick-scott-
florida-governor-ron-desantis-1093598 [https://perma.cc/77UZ-Z5CB] (detailing a number of 
slights by Governor Scott—including throwing an inaugural party for Scott’s Senate swearing in 
at the Governor’s Mansion after Governor DeSantis had already moved in—leading to a 
“contentious handoff”). 
 109. Governor Scott appointed five judges the afternoon of his last day in office and 
appointed Carlos Beruff, a controversial Florida developer and friend of Governor Scott, to the 
Florida Wildlife Commission. Id. 
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significant power—potentially in conflict with his successor—in picking 
the new justices. Just like a tree that is already cut down, the power had 
already been exercised and the damage done.  
Instead, Justice Lewis’s dissent provides the clearest—and the only 
pragmatic—approach to the use of quo warranto writs: When the state 
actor’s “pronouncement of his intent to [act beyond the limits of his 
power] is unequivocal, not conjectural or hypothetical,” the writ is 
available as a remedy.110 This interpretation of the use of quo warranto 
writs is in line with historical usage, Florida precedent, and practical use 
of this extraordinary writ. 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Turner v. Shumlin, 163 A.3d 1173, 1177 (Vt. 2017); see League of Women Voters v. 
Scott, 232 So. 3d 264, 268–71 (Fla. 2017) (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
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